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I. INTRODUCTION
Many physicians "dose down" a drug approved by the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") when prescribing it for children to account for their
lower body weight. Children, however, may react differently to drugs than
adults for a variety of reasons including kidney and liver development. The
practice of "dosing down" may not always account for these physiological dif-
ferences. 1 Indeed, some physicians may worry about adverse side effects
when "dosing down" and may opt to prescribe less effective medication that is
known not to have serious adverse effects in children. The dilemma presents
physicians with a choice, on the one hand, to prescribe a potentially more ef-
fective medication and risk adverse side effects because it has not been tested
in pediatric populations, or, on the other hand, to use an older and perhaps less
effective drug. Recognizing the problem of safe and effective drug use in
children, Congress and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have enacted
statutes and regulations respectively, which only begin to address the plethora
of problems associated with prescribing drugs to pediatric populations.
It was not until the past decade that Congress significantly recognized the
need for drug testing in pediatric populations. The first in the line of these leg-
islative schemes was the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of
1997 ("FDAMA"), which included a pediatric drug exclusivity provision to
encourage drug testing in children. 2 Although drug companies were not re-
quired to conduct clinical trials in children, the FDAMA encouraged such drug
testing by offering a six-month patent extension period.3
With the impending 2002 sunset provision of the FDAMA, Congress
Jerome Groopman, The Pediatric Gap: Why Have Most Medications Never Been
Properly Tested on Kids?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 10, 2005, at 32, 32-35 (describing the myriad
of problems associated with administering drugs to pediatric patients).
2 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115. §
111, 111 Stat. 2296. 2305-09 (1997) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355a). amended by
Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
3 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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passed the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act ("BPCA"). 4 The BPCA also
grants the six-month patent exclusivity extension but goes one step further.5 If
the FDA determines more information is needed about a particular drug, it can
refer the drug to the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") and authorize the
NIH to collect funds and award research grants to third parties to test the
drug.6 The BPCA also establishes a public fund that the FDA can use to pay a
third party directly to conduct the appropriate tests. 7 The results of these tests
must then be reported back to the FDA.8 The BPCA, however, sunsets in
2007.'
On the heels of the FDAMA, the FDA promulgated the 1998 "Pediatric
Rule," which allowed the FDA to require pediatric testing on already marketed
drugs and require pediatric testing and labeling of new drugs. ' 0 Pharmaceuti-
cal companies, however, could request a full or partial waiver of this require-
ment.11 In October 2002, a United States District Court for the District of
Columbia struck down the 1998 Pediatric Rule as incompatible with the BPCA
and exceeding the authority of the FDA under the Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act ("FDCA"). 12 Shortly after the court's decision, Congress passed the Pedi-
atric Research Equity Act of 2003 ("PREA"). 1 3 The PREA codified the "Pe-
diatric Rule," and it will sunset in 2007.14
The importance of regulated pediatric clinical trials is underscored by
medical discoveries that adults and children react differently to certain medica-
tions. One malady present in both the pediatric and adult population is depres-
sion. Although exact biological differences between adult and pediatric
depression are unclear, some experts believe they are not identical and there-
fore antidepressant medications may work differently in a developing brain. 15
4 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
' 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (Supp. IV 2004).
6 42 U.S.C. § 284m(a)-(b) (Supp. ii 2003).
7 Id. §§ 284m(c)(1), (d).
I d. § 284m(c)(6)(A).
9 21 U.S.C. § 355a(n) (Supp. IV 2004) (sunset date is Oct. 1, 2007).
'o Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness ofNew
Drugs and Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed. Reg. 66.632. 66,639 (Dec. 2, 1998)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 312. 314, and 601).
' 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.55(c)(1)-(4), 601.27(c)(1)-(4) (2006). See also Ass'n ofAm.. Phy-
sicians & Surgeons. Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208 (D.D.C. 2002).
12 Ass 'n ofAm., Physicians & Surgeons, Inc.. 226 F. Supp. 2d at 220-21 (describing that
the "Pediatric Rule" was neither accepted nor rejected by Congress when adopting the BPCA
and that the "Pediatric Rule" exceeds the FDA's statutory authority).
13 Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355c (Supp. IV 2004)).
14 Id.: Groopman, supra note 1, at 35 ("In 2003. Congress passed legislation that codi-
fied what is known as the Pediatric Rule .... [T]he reforms include a 'sunset clause' . . . (This
clause was added as a result of pressure from drug companies and groups that oppose govern-
ment regulation.)").
15 Groopman, supra note 1. at 34 ("Although the precise biological differences between
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For example, in 2003, the British government concluded that Seroxat (known
as Paxil in the United States) should not be prescribed to children because of
increased suicidal behavior and withdrawal symptoms. 16 The FDA followed
suit -- but not until ten months later. 17
Eli Lilly recently received bad press when college student Traci Johnson
committed suicide after moving from the antidepressant Cymbalta to a placebo
during a clinical trial for treatment of depression, thus highlighting the poten-
tial problem of withdrawal from a drug. 18 Although the FDA cleared Eli Lilly
of wrongdoing, 19 this tragic episode highlights some problems associated with
pediatric testing. Indeed, at about the same time, the FDA reported the results
of a 2004 study indicating that twice as many children taking antidepressants
had suicidal behavior compared to children taking placebos. 20 This study ex-
emplifies the need for heightened monitoring of children in pediatric studies --
because pediatric populations may react differently than adult populations.
Despite both FDA and congressional attempts to address the problems of
prescription drug use in children, several deficiencies and loopholes exist.
Thus, conducting clinical trials in this vulnerable population must be highly
regulated. Part Ii briefly introduces that the historical treatment of children
impacts regulatory reform. Part III will explain the evolution of regulatory and
legislative approaches to pediatric drug testing, highlighting how each new
legislative program contained special precautions to widen the number of
drugs tested in children and also protected children as participants in clinical
trials. Part IV, however, demonstrates how these statutory and regulatory pro-
visions have failed to address the use of antidepressant mediation in pediatric
patients. In response to learning that pediatric populations may be at risk when
taking antidepressant mediation, Congress held hearings to determine whether
the FDA and drug manufacturers were conducting and publicizing the results
of positive, negative, and inconclusive clinical trials. As the sunset date of the
current programs approaches, new policy changes are proposed in Part V for
consideration as the FDA moves forward. While the recent legislative
schemes offer some protection to children as clinical subjects, they do not pro-
adult depression and childhood depression are not yet known, there is reason to believe that the
maladies are not identical, and that antidepressants may work differently on a developing
brain.").
16 Id. at 35 (describing that in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the British government
monitored reports of selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors and ultimately concluded they were
not safe for use in children).
17 E.g.. id.
"8 Id. at 34 ("Indeed. Eli Lilly and Company recently received a tremendous amount of
bad press when Traci Johnson, an Indiana college student, committed suicide during a clinical
trial of Cymbalta, an antidepressant.").
19 E.g.. id.: U.S. Finds No Link Between a Suicide and a Lilly Drug, N.Y. TINEs, Aug.
13, 2004. at C4.
20 Groopman, supra note 1, at 34 ("Johnson's death occurred at the same time that the
F.D.A. was analyzing a large set of data compiled from multiple clinical trials. The results.
which were released in October, indicated that twice as many children taking antidepressants in
clinical trials considered or attempted suicide as children taking placebos.").
[Vol. 4:59
REFORMING FDA POLICY FOR PEDIATRIC TESTING
vide enough protection once the drug is on the market. Legislative and policy
reforms might include the following: public disclosure of all clinical trials,
changes in the exclusivity provision, labeling changes, and post-approval drug
surveillance.
Ii. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF CHILDREN IN DRUG TESTING IMPACTS
REGULATORY REFORM
Historically, children were used as subjects in medical experiments. 21
Until the later part of the twentieth century, the government made few efforts
to regulate pediatric testing, and children were often forced to participate in
dangerous tests.22 In addition, the testing among pediatric populations usually
focused on understanding a disease, rather than testing new drugs that could be
used to treat it.
Children need protection from medical mistreatment. This set of ethical
concerns, regarding the protection of children entering a clinical trial, includes
issues such as consent, protection of disabled children, and associated health
risks. A thorough discussion of the ethical dilemmas regarding children in
clinical trials is beyond the scope of this Article, but a large body of law re-
23
view articles specifically addresses this difficult and critical area.
Clinical trials for safe and effective treatments of childhood ailments
need to be conducted. This Article focuses on this set of issues that concerns
the testing of pediatric drugs to determine whether they are safe and effective
for pediatric populations. As described above, because relatively few drugs
are tested on pediatric populations, doctors tend to "dose down" adult dosages
to account for the lower body weight in children. Children, however, have
physiological differences that may cause a drug to metabolize differently.
Government regulations aimed at promoting and even requiring drug testing in
children are necessary to ensure the safe and effective use of drugs in pediatric
populations. Described below are the current legislative and regulatory
schemes addressing such drug experimentation in pediatric populations. Al-
21 See generally Susan E. Lederer & Michael A. Grodin, Historical Overview: Pediatric
Experimentation, in CHILDREN AS RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND LAW 3, 3-20 (Mi-
chael A. Grodin & Leonard H. Glantz eds.. 1994).
22 Lauren Hammer Breslow. Note, The Best Pharmaceuticalsfor Children Act of2002:
The Rise of the Voluntary Incentive Structure and Congressional Refusal to Require Pediatric
Testing, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 133, 135-41 (2003); Lederer & Grodin, supra note 21 (describ-
ing children as research subjects in eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries); Leonard H.
Glantz, The Law of Human Experimentation with Children, in CHILDREN AS RESEARCH
SUBJECTS: SCIENCE, ETHICS. AND LAW 103, 103 (Michael A. Grodin & Leonard H. Glantz eds.,
1994) [hereinafter Glantz. The Law of Human Experimentation with Children] (explaining that
until the last half of the twentieth century virtually no regulations governed pediatric testing).
23 See, e.g.. Carrie Fisher & Thomas G. Keens, Participation of Children in Research,
26 WHITTIER L. REv. 823 (2005); Glantz. The Law of Human Experimentation with Children,
supra note 22; Leonard H. Glantz. Research with Children, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 213 (1998).
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though these schemes are a good starting point to address the problems of drug
testing in children, they do not go far enough.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACTS DESIGNED TO PROTECT
CHILDREN IN THE TESTING AND USE OF FDA APPROVED DRUGS
In 1997, Congress enacted the FDAMA, which, although affecting nu-
merous FDA regulations, also has been the first congressional action to ad-
dress specifically the problems of testing new drugs in children.24 The
FDAMA was followed by key regulations and subsequent congressional acts
focusing on the emerging recognition of the need for pediatric drug testing.
A. Patent Exclusivity for Voluntarily Conducting Pediatric Trials
The FDAMA significantly changed the regulatory scheme for pediatric
testing. Most notably, it granted pharmaceutical companies a six-month patent
extension in exchange for conducting pediatric trials of their drug. 25 The pat-
ent exclusivity provision applied only to future or existing patented drugs.26
That is, if a drug company was outside the exclusive period provided by the
patent, pediatric clinical trials for that particular drug would not give the
pharmaceutical company an exclusive six-month market.
The market exclusivity approach is similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which allows patent extensions for drugs in order to compensate for the time
the drug is moving through the regulatory process.27 Prior to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, a pharmaceutical company would receive a patent for its drug
before completing the FDA regulatory approval process but could not market
the drug until the FDA approved it. Therefore, the company would not be able
to enjoy the market exclusivity granted by the patent while the drug was in the
regulatory pipeline. The Hatch-Waxman Act allows a patent extension tacked
on to the end of a drug's patent term to compensate for the delay experienced
28during the approval process.
24 See generally Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, §
505A, 111 Stat. 2296, 2305-09 (1997) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355a). While the
FDA attempted to regulate pediatric research studies through enactment of rules, the FDAMA
of 1997 is the first congressional act to specifically address pediatric drug research. Id. See
Christopher-Paul Milne. Exploring the Frontiers ofLaw and Science: FDAAL4 's Pediatric Stud-
ies Incentive, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 491, 491 (2002) (describing the push for the Better Pharma-
ceuticals for Children Act and its incorporation into the FDAMA); Breslow, supra note 22, at
151-55 (describing steps taken by the FDA to regulate pediatric testing but also noting that Con-
gress enacted the FDAMA which overhauled the FDCA).
2' 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see Breslow. supra note 22, at 155-57
(discussing the market exclusivity provision).
26 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (applying to both new drugs and already-marketed drugs).
2' 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000 & Supp. ii 2003): 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2000).
28 21 U.S.C. § 355.
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Providing patent extensions for voluntary pediatric drug testing has been
described as a "carrot and stick" approach. 29 The "carrot" is the six-month
market exclusivity granted to pharmaceutical companies, beyond the granted
patent time period, that conduct pediatric clinical trials voluntarily. 0  This
market exclusivity provision could potentially allow pharmaceutical compa-
nies to make millions of dollars for heavily prescribed drugs. The "stick" is
the FDA rule that requires companies to assess the safety and effectiveness of
the drug in pediatric populations.
At that time, a second provision of the FDAMA stated that the Secretary
is "to develop a list of drugs for which additional pediatric information may be
beneficial., 32 Under this provision, the Secretary is to publish a prioritized list
of FDA approved drugs that are deemed to need clinical testing in pediatric
patients. 33 This list is to be updated annually. 34 Another provision applied to
conducting pediatric studies. 35 This provision discusses the protocols and time
frame for the requirements of pediatric clinical studies.36 The BPCA, enacted
in 2002, addressed and changed section 11 1 and is discussed in greater detail
below.
B. The FDA Required Pediatric Testing Under the 1998 Final Rule
The FDA also proceeded on its own course to regulate drug testing in pe-
diatric patients and promulgated the 1998 Final Rule.37 The 1998 Final Rule
acknowledged the market exclusivity provision in the FDAMA. The FDA
rule, however, went beyond the voluntary pediatric testing requirement in the
FDAMA by allowing the FDA to require pediatric testing of already approved
29 Kurt R. Karst, Comment, Pediatric Testing of Prescription Drugs: The Food and
Drug Administration's Carrot and Stick for the Pharmaceutical Industry, 49 AM. U.L. REV.
739, 739, 743-44 (2000) (describing the "carrot and stick" approach).
30 Karst, supra note 29, at 743-44; see Breslow. supra note 22, at 155 (describing the
six-month patent extension as a "financial boom for manufacturers").
" Karst, supra note 29, at 744; cf Christopher-Paul Milne. supra note 24, at 495
("Seemingly taking their cue from the stance of the Executive Office, some members of Con-
gress accused FDA of playing 'hide the carrot' by requesting only a small number of pediatric
trials under FDAMA. At the same time, the agency ostentatiously waved the stick by report-
edly stating that, if the opportunity offered by the FDAMA incentives went unanswered, FDA
would 'consider exercising its authority to require studies."').
32 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115. §
505A(b). 111 Stat. 2296. 2306 (1997) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355a); see Breslow,
supra note 22, at 156.
33 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 505A(b).
34 id.
31 Id. § 505A(d). 111 Stat. at 2307.
36 Id. § 505A(d)(2).
37 Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness ofNew
Drugs and Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed. Reg. 66.632. 66.633 (Dec. 2,
1998); see generally Breslow, supra note 22. at 159-63 (discussing the Final Rule).
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and marketed drugs and to favor pediatric testing in new drugs. 38 In compiling
the Pediatric List, the FDA included all drugs that are approved for use in
adults for a disease or condition that occurs in children. 39 The FDA also re-
quires new drugs that had a high probability of use in pediatric populations to
undergo pediatric testing.
40
Under the 1998 Final Rule, pharmaceutical companies could request a
waiver for pediatric testing. 41 To receive a waiver, the FDA must be satisfied
that (1) the drug did not provide a therapeutic benefit over the existing treat-
ment and (2) the drug would not be used in a substantial number of pediatric
patients.42 If a company did not receive a waiver, the FDA could file an action
in federal court seeking an injunction based on the manufacturer's noncompli-
ance. 43 The court could then require the manufacturer to assess the safety and
effectiveness of the drug in pediatric populations.
In addition, the FDA separated the pediatric population into the following
arbitrary age groups: neonates (up to one month old); infants (one month to
two years old); children (two to twelve years old); and adolescents (twelve to
sixteen years old). 45 These age ranges, however, do not necessarily account
for physiological differences. Moreover, older teenagers and young adults
may still undergo developmental changes. Issues regarding these age groups
are further discussed below.
C. Pediatric Testing of Both Patented and Off-Patent Drugs is Permitted
Under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act
3 Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness ofNew
Drugs and Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed. Reg. 66.632. 66.634 (Dec. 2,
1998).
'9 FDA Docket No. 98 N-0056, List of Drugs for Which Additional Pediatric Informa-
tion May Produce Health Benefits in the Pediatric Population 1. 1-3 (May 20. 1998); see Mi-
chael S. Labson, Pediatric Priorities: Legislative and Regulatory Initiatives to ExpandResearch
on the Use of Medicines in Pediatric Patients, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 34. 47 (2002)
(describing the Pediatric List).
40 See Labson, supra note 39, at 48 (2002).
41 Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness ofNew
Drugs and Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed. Reg. 66.632 (Dec. 2, 1998) (codi-
fied at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 312, 314, and 601 (2006)).
42 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.55(c)(2)(i). 601.27(c)(2)(i) (2002). See Labson. supra note 39. at 54
(describing the waiver provision).
4'' Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness ofNew
Drugs and Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed. Reg. 66. 632, 66.636 (Dec. 2,
1998); see Labson, supra note 39. at 56 (describing enforcement).
44 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.23. 601.27 (2006) (requiring manufacturersto assess the safety
and effectiveness of new drugs and biological products in pediatric patients). See also Labson,
supra note 39, at 56 (describing the enforcement mechanism).
41 William J. Rodriguez. Sci. Dir. for Pediatrics, FDA, CDER's Experience: What We
Have Learned From the Pediatric Initiative (Feb. 20. 2002). available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/presentation/ped init rodriguez/sld024.htm (Microsoft Of-
fice PowerPoint Slide No. 24).
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When enacted, Section 1 11 of the FDAMA was set to sunset in 2002. In
2002, however, Congress enacted the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act
("BPCA"), 46 which includes the market-exclusivity provision in the FDAMA
and also addresses some criticisms of the FDAMA.47 Unlike the FDAMA, the
BPCA addresses the testing of both on-patent and off-patent drugs. Under the
BPCA, the NIH, in collaboration with the FDA, develops lists of drugs that
need additional studies to assess the safety and effectiveness in pediatric popu-
lations. 48 The NIH considers the following criteria to determine whether pedi-
atric testing is needed: "(1) availability of information concerning the safe and
effective use of the drug in the pediatric population; (2) whether additional
information is needed; (3) whether new pediatric studies concerning the drug
may produce health benefits in pediatric population; and (4) whether reforma-
tion of the drug is necessary. 49 Once the list is compiled, the FDA sends a
written request to the manufacturer of each drug to request the pediatric stud-
ies. o If the FDA does not receive a response from the manufacturer within
thirty days, then the FDA will publish a request for third parties, who them-
selves meet particularized criteria for conducting pediatric trials, to conduct the
studies.51
Once the pediatric studies are conducted, either the manufacturer or the
third party submits a report that includes all data generated in the study.52 The
FDA then reviews the report and begins a negotiation process with the manu-
facturer regarding labeling changes. 5 3 If the manufacturer does not agree to a
labeling change, the labeling request is referred to the Pediatric Advisory
Committee to review the information and make a recommendation regarding
the appropriate labeling changes, if any. 54 The FDA then contacts the manu-
facturer with the committee's request. 55 If the manufacturer does not comply
within thirty days, the FDA may deem the drug misbranded and bring an en-
forcement action in federal court.56
The BPCA also addressed many of the ethical dilemmas involved with
conducting pediatric research. First, the BPCA establishes the Office of Pedi-
46 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
47 42 U.S.C. § 284m(a) (2000 & Supp. 1ii 2003) (clarifying the application of the Pediat-
ric Exclusivity provision under section 505A of the Federal Food. Drug. and Cosmetic Act) see
also Breslow. supra note 22, at 173-74 (describing the BPCA as "a greatly matured successor to
the original pediatric exclusivity provision of the DAMA.").
41 Program for Pediatric Studies of Drugs, 42 U.S.C. § 284m(a) (Supp. 111 2003); see
Breslow, supra note 22, at 174-77 (describing the Program for Pediatric Studies of Drugs).
49 42 U.S.C. § 284m(a)(2).
50 Id. § 284m(b)(c).
51 See id. § 284m(c)(2).
52 See id. § 284m(c)(6)(A).
53 See id. § 284m(c)(7).
54 See id. § 284m(c)(8).
55 Id. § 284m(c)(9).
56 See id. §§ 284m(c)(10)-(11).
2007]
INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW
atric Therapeutics within the FDA to coordinate and facilitate activities related
to pediatric issues. 57 Second, the BPCA establishes a procedure for contract-
ing with the Institute of Medicine ("IOM") to review pediatric studies. 58 The
1OM is to review numerous areas including assent, informed consent, benefits
and risk, "minimal risk," and the role of the institutional review board in con-
ducting the trial. 59 The BPCA also contains an October 1, 2007, sunset
clause.6 °
With the enactment of the BPCA, the Bush administration suspended the
611998 Final Rule in May 2002. In response, the Department of Health and
Human Services ("1HS") announced the BPCA and the 1998 Final Rule could
coexist but asked for public comment regarding what steps to take for the FDA
to accommodate the BPCA. 62 The common ground 1THS asked for never
came to fruition because, in 2002, the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia held the 1998 Final Rule "[exceeded] the FDA's statutory authority and
[was] therefore invalid. '63
D. The Pediatric Research Equity Act Essentially Codified the 1998
Final Rule
In response to the district court's decision, in 2003 Congress amended
the FDCA by enacting the Pediatric Research Equity Act ("PREA").64 The
PREA essentially codifies the 1998 Final Rule and specifically grants the FDA
the authority to require pediatric testing of new and already approved drugs.
For new drug applications, the FDA has the authority to grant manufac-
turers either a full or partial waiver for pediatric testing. A full waiver for new
drugs is allowed in the following circumstances: (1) when a small patient
population makes studies practically impossible; (2) when evidence suggests
57 21 U.S.C. § 393a(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 2004); see Breslow, supra note 22. at 178-79 (de-
scribing "Structural Administrative Changes").
5 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1416 (2002)
(codified at 42 USC §§ 289 note(a). note(b)); 42 U.S.C. § 289 note(a) (Supp. 1i 2003).
59 42 U.S.C. § 289 note(b).
60 21 U.S.C. § 355a(n) (Supp. IV 2004).
6! Breslow. supra note 22, at 185 ("[i]n May 2002, the Bush administration decided to
suspend the rule in light of the BPCA's comprehensive structure.").62 Id. ("HHS announced that the BPCA and the 1998 final rule could coexist, but also
asked for public comment on 'what additional steps [the FDA could] take to assure adequate
study of drugs in children in light of the BPCA.").
63 Ass'n of Am., Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA. 226 F. Supp. 2d 204. 222 (D.D.C.
2002).
64 Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355c (Supp. IV 2004)).
65 21 U.S.C. § 355c(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 2004): Groopman, supra note 1. at 35 ("In 2003,
Congress passed legislation that codified what is known as the Pediatric Rule. A drug company
working on a new treatment for a disease that affects both adults and children is now required to
conduct pediatric studies.").
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the drug will be ineffective or unsafe for all pediatric ages; (3) when the drug
does not represent a meaningful benefit over existing therapies; or (4) when
66the drug will not be used in a substantial number of pediatric patients. A
partial waiver for new drugs may be granted for particular age groups for the
same reasons as described for granting a full waiver, but granting a partial
waiver also requires the manufacturer to show that reasonable attempts to pro-
duce a pediatric formulation for a particular age group have failed.6 7
For already approved drugs, the PREA grants the FDA authority to re-
quire pediatric studies if the drug is used in a substantial number of pediatric
patients for uses indicated on the label, the absence of pediatric labeling poses
significant risks, and data suggest the drug will represent a meaningful thera-
peutic benefit over existing therapies. 68 The FDA can grant a full waiver for
pediatric studies if the studies are practically impossible to complete or there is
strong evidence the drug would be unsafe or ineffective in all pediatric popula-
tions. 69 A partial waiver for particular age groups for already approved drugs
may be granted for the same reasons as a full waiver. In addition, a partial
waiver for a particular age group will be granted if the FDA determines four
criteria: (1) the drug will not represent a meaningful therapeutic benefit over
existing treatment; (2) the drug is not likely to be used in a substantial number
of pediatric patients in a particular age group; (3) the absence of labeling does
not pose a significant threat; and (4) the manufacturer can demonstrate that
reasonable attempts to produce a formula for that age group have failed. 71 The
drug label must indicate whether a waiver has been granted.
Upon passage, Senator Dodd addressed the Senate to explain that the
main point of the PREA is to give the "FDA the clear authority to require that
drugs be tested and formulated for children. ' ,73 Like the BPCA, the PREA will
sunset in 2007. 74
IV. THE ANTIDEPRESSANT STORY Is A MODEL FOR THE DEFICIENCIES IN
THE CURRENT LEGISLATION
Although the BPCA and the PREA provide for the identification of drugs
that need to be tested in pediatric patients and offer protection for children en-
tering clinical studies, they do not go far enough to address many other health
and safety concerns. The controversy surrounding the use of antidepressant
66 21 U.S.C. § 355c(a)(4)(A).
67 Id. § 355c(a)(4)(B).
68 Id. § 355c(b)(1).
69 Id. § 355c(b)(2)(A).
70 Id. § 355c(b)(2)(B).
71 Id. §§ 355c(b)(2)(B)(iii)(aa). (bb), (iv).
72 Id. § 355c(b)(2)(D).
73 149 CON. REc. S981 1, S9818 (2003).
74 21 U.S.C. § 355a(n) (referring to amendment of21 U.S.C. 351 et seq.).
2007]
INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW
medication in pediatric patients offers a good case study to analyze the defi-
ciencies in the current legislative scheme. As is often the case, it may be diffi-
cult to cover all areas ex ante when promulgating legislative and regulatory
schemes. Over the past few years, tests of multiple antidepressant medications
in pediatric patients revealed antidepressants either did not work, induced sui-
cidal behavior, or caused withdrawal symptoms when the patient was taken off
the drug. 1 Indeed, reports surfaced that some drug manufacturers may have
known about the ineffectiveness or even negative effects of antidepressants for
years.76 The FDA's authority to require pediatric testing may have brought
some of the negative effects of antidepressant drug use in children to light, but
the regulatory scheme was neither able to address anecdotal information effec-
tively, follow-up on manufacturer's information in clinical studies, nor re-
spond quickly to developments in sister organizations in other countries.
Therefore, the antidepressant story can be used to highlight where the defi-
ciencies in pediatric testing exist and mark a good starting point to broaden the
FDA's regulatory authority to protect children.
A. The Forest Laboratories Clinical Studies Demonstrate Conflicting
Clinical Results
In the spring of 2004, Forest Laboratories announced that its antidepres-
sant drug, Lexapro, did not help depressed pediatric patients.7 7 Lexapro con-
tains the same active ingredient as Celexa. 7' The patent on Celexa is about to
expire and it has been reported that perhaps Forest Laboratories is promoting
Lexapro so as to make money during the patent exclusivity time period. 79 In
the wake of the Lexapro announcement, Forest Laboratories also addressed its
inadequate disclosure of a failed unpublished study in 2002 regarding use of
Celexa in children. Only now, Forest Laboratories stated that a more recent
2004 test indicates Celexa may indeed help children. The results of the study,
which was conducted in Europe from 1996 to 2002, showed Celexa had no
greater effects than a placebo. 80 That study, however, was published in a Dan-
7' Barry Meier. Drug Maker Acknowledges Some Negative Test Results, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 26, 2004, at C3 [hereinafter Meier. Negative Test Results]: Groopman, supra note 1. at 35-
6.
76 Meier. Negative Test Results. supra note 75 (stating that Forest officials had not told a
medical journal about a failed unpublished study in 2002 regarding the use of Celexa in children
and adolescents prior to the medical journal's publication of an article about a separate test indi-
cating the drug could help young people. Further, some of the authors of this article were Forest
employees.).
77 Id. ("Forest Laboratories has said a recently concluded test found that its antidepres-
sant Lexapro did not help depressed children and adolescents, an announcement that comes
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ish textbook and therefore received little attention.81 Two of the outside re-
searchers involved in the positive study on Celexa stated they did not know
about the results of the earlier study.
8 2
The Lexapro and Celexa clinical studies raise a number of concerns.
First, Forest Laboratories has not explained the discrepancies between the ear-
lier study of Celexa that found no greater effect than a placebo and the more
recent study that concluded the drug could help pediatric patients. Second, it
is disconcerting that previous tests regarding the efficacy of Celexa in pediatric
patients were not disclosed in a major medical or pharmaceutical journal or to
the FDA. Third, the results of the Lexapro study showing that Lexapro did not
help depressed pediatric patients is inconsistent with the recent positive results
in the Celexa study because they contain essentially the same active ingredient.
Perhaps other factors in the design of the clinical study contributed to the dif-
ferences in the results. This suggests a more comprehensive scheme is needed
to regulate the design of pediatric trials. The FDA appears inept at addressing
the information obtained from these clinical trials.
8' Id. ("The European study was sponsored by H. Lundbeck, the Danish company that
developed citalopram, which Forest markets in this country as Celexa."). The basic finding of
that study, which reported that Celexa "showed no effects greater than a placebo was noted in
a chart published" in October 2003 in a medical textbook written in Danish. Id.
82 Id. Two outside researchers involved in the positive Celexa study also said in recent
interviews that Forest did not tell them about the efficacy findings of the European study and
that they were not independently aware of them. Id.
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B. Anecdotal Reports Regarding Selective Serotonin Re-Uptake Inhibitors
Caused the British Medical Health Regulatory Agency to Ban the Use of
This Class ofAntidepressant Drugs in Children
Another class of antidepressant drugs, selective serotonin re-uptake in-
hibitors ("SSRIs"), has caused negative effects in pediatric patients. In the late
1980s, the British Medical Health Regulatory Agency ("BMHRA"), which is
the British counterpart to the FDA, began monitoring reports of suicidal be-
havior and withdrawal symptoms among minors. 83 The British government
issued warnings in 1993 and 2000. 84 In June 2003, the BMHRA convened an
emergency meeting and concluded the drug should not be used for pediatric
patients. 85 The United States followed suit ten months later and banned doc-
tors from prescribing Paxil to children. 86 This ten-month delay prompted, in
part, a congressional investigation into the FDA with respect to pediatric test-
ing.
87
The situation with Paxil raises additional concerns. First, why did it take
over ten years of anecdotal reports suggesting serious negative consequences
before the United States decided to ban the use of Paxil in pediatric popula-
tions? This suggests the FDA does not collect and react to anecdotal reporting
effectively. The PREA is a good start to grant the FDA authority to require
clinical trials for drugs used in pediatric populations. The FDA, however,
must be capable of responding on various fronts in addition to requiring pedi-
atric studies. Second, why did the United States take ten months to ban pediat-
ric prescriptions after the BMHRA concluded its emergency study? The FDA
should have the capability to combine resources with its sister organizations in
other countries. Third, why does the FDA appear to have such a difficult time
determining drug safety in pediatric patients?
C. The Eli Lilly Clinical Studies Showed that the FDA and Researchers
Must be Attentive When Taking Adolescents OffAntidepressants
Eli Lilly recently made headlines when Traci Johnson, a college student,
83 Groopman, supra note 1, at 35 ("In the late nineteen-eighties. Britain's medical regu-
latory agency began closely monitoring anecdotal reports of suicidal behavior and withdrawal
symptoms related to one class of antidepressants .....
84 id.
85 Id. ("In June, 2003. the agency convened an emergency meeting to review pediatric
trial data on Seroxat, and S.S.R.I. known in the United States as Paxil, and concluded that the
drug should not be prescribed for minors.").
86 Id. ("Ten more months passed before the F.D.A. took similar action on children and
antidepressants.").
87 Publication and Disclosure Issues in Antidepressant Pediatric Clinical Trials: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing on Antidepressant Pediatric Trials] (statement
of U.S. Rep. Greg Walden of Oregon).
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committed suicide after being switched to a placebo in a clinical trial of Cym-
balta.88 The severe depression, leading ultimately to suicide, was believed to
be caused by "hallucinations and paranoid delusions [that] can occur when a
patient is withdrawn from an antidepressant." 9 Although Eli Lilly officially
was cleared of all wrongdoing, this experience begs at least two questions: (1)
what were the deficiencies in the clinical design of the Cymbalta trial, if any,
and (2) how can the FDA ensure this tragedy will not be repeated? The Cym-
balta study indicates that children may still be undergoing developmental
changes until their late teens or early twenties. The FDA should consider rede-
fining their pediatric age groups to include college-age students. 90
The BPCA allows for the IOM to oversee many of the ethical concerns
regarding pediatric research and to coordinate with Institutional Review
Boards ("IRBs"). Although this is a good move toward addressing the ethical
problems associated with pediatric research, it appears that anecdotal reporting
of withdrawal symptoms may not have been incorporated into pediatric trials.
The policy recommendations described in Part V may allow a larger breadth of
information for the FDA, the 1OM, and the IRBs to use when establishing and
conducting pediatric trials.
D. Committee Hearings Addressed Antidepressant Clinical Studies in
Pediatric Populations
In 2004, committee hearings commenced to address pediatric trials, and
the house representatives learned the FDA knew that twelve of fifteen pediatric
trials of antidepressant drugs proved that the drugs were ineffective. 91 More-
over, only three of the fifteen studies were published. 92 Representative Joe
Barton of Texas stated,
[M]any people want to know what was in the other 12 stud-
ies? What do these studies show? Why haven't those other
12 studies been published in peer reviewed journals? Was
there sufficient information available to the public about these
unpublished studies to make informed decisions?
93
88 Groopman, supra note 1. at 35.
89 Id. at 34 (describing the Cymbalta study and stating the FDA cleared Eli Lilly of
wrongdoing).
90 Cf Rodriguez. supra note 45 (identifying pediatric age groups up through age six-
teen).
91 Hearing on Antidepressant Pediatric Trials, supra note 87, at 30 (statement of U.S.
Rep. Greg Walden of Oregon).
92 Id. at 1 (statement of U.S. Rep. Joe Barton of Texas, Chairman. Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigations).
93 Id. (statement of U.S. Rep. Joe Barton of Texas, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations).
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The committee hearing focused on the problems of disclosure in clinical
trials. One proposed bill would require manufacturers and researchers to reg-
ister with an online database as a prerequisite for IRB approval. 94 This data-
base would then include the results of all clinical trials whether positive,
inconclusive, or negative. The proposed bill would give the FDA authority to
require this registration and noncompliance would be enforced through civil
penalties. 95 The reporting system would give clinicians all the relevant infor-
mation needed to make informed decisions.
96
In addition, the committee noted that only one antidepressant medication,
Prozac, is approved for treating depression in children. 97 Four other drugs,
however, are prescribed to children with depression in greater frequency than
Prozac. 98 This is particularly troubling because studies suggest that children
taking some antidepressants are 1.89 times more likely to have suicidal
thoughts than those given a placebo. 99 This highlights the importance of con-
ducting clinical trials for all antidepressant medications used to treat childhood
depression and establishing post-market-approval surveillance to determine
whether additional side effects are present.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE DIFFICULTIES
ASSOCIATED WITH PEDIATRIC STUDIES
Pediatric clinical studies are needed to determine safe and effective doses
in children. The protocol of"dosing down" adult prescriptions to account for
the smaller size of children does not address physiological differences between
adults and children. Medications that may be safe for use in adults could be
quite unsafe in children. Children should not be put at risk when a compre-
hensive program can be instituted to address their particularities. Although the
FDAMA, BPCA, and PREA are good starting points with their particular em-
phasis on the treatment of children engaged in a clinical trial, specific changes
and further regulation are needed to protect pediatric patients.
As the FDA comes under increased scrutiny following the wake of the
antidepressants and Vioxx100 scandals, the time is ripe to address obvious and
94 Id. at 13 (statement of U.S. Rep. Edward Markey of Massachusetts).
9' Id. (statement of U.S. Rep. Edward Markey of Massachusetts).
96 Id. (statement of U.S. Rep. Edward Markey of Massachusetts).
97 Id. at 39 (statement ofJanet Woodcock, FDA Deputy Commissioner of Operations).
98 Id. at 218 (statement of U.S. Rep. Greg Walden of Oregon, Vice Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations).
99 Id. at 7 (statement of U.S. Rep. Greg Walden of Oregon. Vice Chairman, Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations).
'oo See Gina Kolata, Merck and ioxx: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1. 2004, at A1;
Gardiner Harris. Drug-Safety Reviewer Says F.D.A. Delayed ioxx Study. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2004, at A21: Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, Warning Signs: E-Mails Suggest
Merck Knew I'ioxx's Dangers at Early Stage; As Heart-Risk Evidence Rose, Officials Played
Hardball; Internal Message: 'Dodge!'; Company Says 'Out of Context,' WALL ST. J., Nov. 1,
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notable deficiencies in the current regulatory scheme. Moreover, because the
Act will sunset in 2007, new policy changes need to be implemented. A vari-
ety of policy recommendations should be considered as both Congress and the
FDA move forward to meet these challenges. Policy suggestions include the
following: (1) listing the trials of drugs in public databases and including re-
ports of inconclusive or negative clinical trials, (2) changing the exclusivity
provision, (3) labeling changes, and (4) implementing effective post-approval
surveillance mechanisms.
A. Public Databases That Disclose Medical Device and Drug Tests by
Reporting Inconclusive or Negative Clinical Trials
The FDA should establish a public database that lists all drugs, clinical
trials, and results of the clinical trials. The American Medical Association
("AMA") and other medical groups are placing pressure on the FDA to estab-
lish a database where clinical trials can be tracked from beginning to end. 10,
In addition, some medical journals are contemplating requiring manufacturers
to register their clinical trials with the journal as a prerequisite to publica-
tion. 102 Although this type of policy reform could be applied to the FDA as a
whole, perhaps a smaller sample size that is focused on pediatric trials will
allow the FDA to learn how to manage this type of public database before ex-
panding it to every clinical trial.
To date, if a pharmaceutical company performs a clinical study in which
the results show the drug is not helpful for a particular condition, then the
clinical study is often not published. For example, if a manufacturer conducts
a clinical trial to determine whether its FDA-approved drug for headaches may
also be beneficial for muscle aches, but the results of the study show that the
drug is not clinically helpful for muscle aches, then the study may not be re-
ported. In this example, no negative side effects are reported, so it may not
cause a public health hazard. Although it may not harm a person to take the
headache medicine for a muscle ache, would it not be helpful for that person to
at least know that the test has been conducted?
What if the pharmaceutical company learned in its study that its FDA-
approved drug indeed causes muscle aches? Is the pharmaceutical company
2004, at AL Eric J. Topol, Failing the Pubic Health Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351 N.
ENG. J. MED. 1707, 1707-09 (2004).
101 See Meier, Negative Test Results, supra note 75 ("The American Medical Association
has called on the federal government to create a database in which trials can be tracked from
start to finish."): see also Barry Meier, Medicine's Data Gap: When Labels Mislead; Results of
Drug Trials Can Mystify Doctors Through Omission, N.Y. TIMES. July 21, 2004, at C1 ("In
recent weeks, the academy and other medical groups have met with lawmakers to discuss possi-
ble legislation requiring companies to list tests of drugs and medical devices in a public data-
base.").
102 Meier. Negative Test Results. supra note 75 ("And several medical journals are con-
sidering a proposal that would require trials to be registered at the outset as a prerequisite to the
results' eventual publication.").
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now required to publish the results of the negative study? To date, the phar-
maceutical company must make the results of its study known to the FDA, but
neither the pharmaceutical company nor the FDA seems to disseminate the
results. 103 In addition to labeling requirements, pharmaceutical companies
should be required to publish the results of clinical studies that have negative
clinical results on a particular patient population in a public database.
In addition to the failure to report negative or inconclusive clinical trials,
a recent study suggests that a publication bias exists for studies funded by
pharmaceutical companies. 104 It appears thatjournals are more likely to a pub-
lish research supported by drug companies compared with clinical trials un-
supported by drug companies. 05 If this is true, then a public database of all
clinical trials and their results should be available to the public. This will al-
low physicians to receive unfiltered information and then narrow their drug
choice when prescribing medications to patients.
The Lexapro and Celexa clinical studies illustrate the importance of this
type of information dissemination. A mandatory database that publishes all
clinical trials and their results would provide a full picture to the medical com-
munity. 106 It would most likely be cumbersome and difficult to parse through
the information if each phase of the pediatric trials were recorded in the
database. Therefore, each Phase III trial should be registered in the database
and include background information regarding the earlier phases. If, however,
the drug never makes it past a Phase I trial for either safety or efficacy reasons,
then this information should be uploaded to the database and also indicated on
the label.
In this way, public disclosure of all registered clinical trials will include
positive, inconclusive, and negative results. For example, this type of informa-
tion dissemination of antidepressant medication trials could have impacted the
medications physicians prescribed to their patients. Indeed, pediatric trials of
many of the drugs believed to cause suicidal thoughts were conducted, but the
results of these studies were not widely available. If the antidepressants either
did not help pediatric patients or worse yet caused negative side effects, this
information should be made public. Under the current regulatory scheme,
1'0 Hearing on Antidepressant Pediatric Trials, supra note 87. at 8 (statement of U.S.
Rep. Henry Waxman of California) ("They are making it known to the FDA because they have
to, and we want to ask why [the] FDA has not done more to get this information out, but there is
a clear responsibility for the companies .... ").
104 John Yaphe, Richard Edman, Barry Knishkowy & Joseph Herman, The Association
Between Funding by Commercial Interests and Study Outcome in Randomized Controlled Drug
Trials, 18 FAM. PRAC. 565, 567 (2001) (discussing the results of their publication bias study).
105 id.
106 Hearing on Antidepressant Pediatric Trials, supra note 87, at 35 (statement of U.S.
Rep. Henry Waxman of California) (discussing a new bill that would establish a registry of
information about all the studies performed that would include positive, negative, and inconclu-
sive studies).
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these studies are not required to be published. A federal registry of these test
results, compiled by the FDA, could alleviate this problem.
Opponents to the required public disclosure of the results of all clinical
trials might argue against heightened regulatory schemes. They might argue
that increased regulatory measures in one area might lead to increased regula-
tory measures in other areas. For example, the FDA might begin to regulate a
physician's ability to prescribe drugs "off-label." This is unlikely, however,
because off-label use of drugs is an accepted practice and even defined in the
regulations. 107
Opponents may also argue that the drug industry will set up a public reg-
istry voluntarily, thus obviating the need for legislation. 108 In light of the un-
reported Forest Laboratories studies described earlier, a clear requirement to
report pediatric trials appears necessary to address inconclusive and negative
results. Regulations aimed at full disclosure of clinical trials are needed to
fully inform the medical community.
B. Changes Should Be Made to the Exclusivity Provision
When the BPCA was first passed, debate surrounded the voluntary incen-
tive structure for pediatric testing. Proponents argued that this legislative ac-
tion, including the exclusionary provision, provides important incentives to
pharmaceutical companies resulting in pediatric testing. 109 Other supporters
like the voluntary structure because they favor the incentive process over man-
datory pediatric testing. 10 As discussed below, to date, as long as the manu-
facturer conducts the studies and submits the results to the FDA, the
manufacturer receives the market exclusivity extension. That is, even if the
results of the studies are negative, the manufacturer will be granted the six-
month patent extension.
Opponents of the voluntary incentive structure argued that some pediatric
testing should be mandatory."' Moreover, the exclusivity provision costs
consumers enormous amounts of money in subsidizing the research because
the cost of the trials and exclusionary period are passed along to the consumer.
112 First, a manufacturer may raise the price of a drug to pay for the clinical
trials. Second, consumers have access only to the one drug during the six-
107 Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Un-
approved by the Food and Drug Administration. 37 Fed. Reg. 16.503. 16,503-04 (Aug. 15,
1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130); see Breslow, supra note 22. at 145 (discussing off-
label practice).
108 Hearing on Antidepressant Pediatric Trials, supra note 87, at 36 (statement of U.S.
Rep. Henry Waxman of California) (stating that Congress is going to hear that drug companies
are willing to set up a registry voluntarily).
'09 Breslow, supra note 22, at 182-83 (citing congressional records regarding the BPCA).
I'o d. at 183 (noting proponents' positions).
I d. (citing congressional records regarding the BPCA).
112 Id. at 183. 189 (discussing costs passed onto the consumer directly or indirectly).
2007]
INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW
month exclusivity period even if the results of the pediatric trial are negative.
Hence, the consumers pay on both ends for the clinical studies. In some situa-
tions where the manufacturer does not conduct a required pediatric trial for
already approved drugs, tax money may be used to conduct the study. There-
fore, it costs the citizen money either as a consumer or as a taxpayer.
The PREA addressed the opponents' concerns to some extent, but it did
not go far enough. The PREA recognized the exclusivity provision in the
BPCA, but it changed the voluntary incentive structure. As described in Part
III, the FDA established a list of drugs requiring pediatric testing. 1 13 For FDA-
approved drugs, the FDA gave an option to the manufacturer to test the drug.
If the manufacturer did not want to test the drug, then the FDA could contract
with a third party to conduct the test. " 4 For new drugs, the FDA could require
pharmaceutical companies to either conduct a pediatric clinical trial or apply
for a waiver. The revision in the PREA, however, did not address the cost to
the consumer and taxpayer.
As policy considerations, the patent extension should be conditioned on
the following two criteria. First, the drug must be shown to be safe and effec-
tive in the approved pediatric trials. That is, the exclusivity provision should
apply only to drugs that will be approved for use in pediatric populations. To
date, if a manufacturer conducts a pediatric trial, but the drug is shown to be
unsafe or ineffective, the manufacturer still receives the market exclusion. 15
Opponents of this idea may argue that the high cost of clinical trials will create
disincentives for manufacturers to conduct the trials without the guarantee of
receiving the market exclusion. This is because the manufacturers become
familiar with the six-month extension. If, however, the market extension was
changed to an "icing on the cake" benefit for the required testing, then manu-
facturers would be required to conduct the trials and receive a benefit only if
the drug is safe and effective in pediatric populations. Thus, consumers will
bear the cost only for drugs that will be used in pediatric populations and not
for all drugs tested on children. For new drug applications, the six-month
market exclusion could be tacked on to the patent extension granted under the
Hatch-Waxman Act.
Second, the patent extension should occur only after the label changes
are fully implemented.11 6 As described below, the average time for a label
113 Program for Pediatric Studies of Drugs, 42 U.S.C. § 284m(a)(1) (Supp. 1I12003); List
of Drugs for which Additional Pediatric Information may Produce Health benefits in the Pediat-
ric Population, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,733, 27,734 (May 20, 1998).
114 42 U.S.C. § 284m(b)-(c).
... Hearing on Antidepressant Pediatric Trials, supra note 87, at 17 (statement of U.S.
Rep. Bart Stupack of Michigan).
116 Id. ("We have it backwards. The patent extension should only occur if the drug is
safe, effective and after the necessary label changes are fully implemented. Then, and only
then, should a patent extension be granted.").
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change is five months, and in some cases it occurs after one year. 1 7 Physi-
cians need to know how to appropriately prescribe medications to pediatric
populations, and the patent extension should not begin until the appropriate
label changes are made.
C. The New Policy Should Address Labeling Changes
The results of all pediatric clinical trials should follow a more rigid time
frame. The antidepressant cases highlight the importance of disseminating all
known information to physicians so they can prescribe the correct drug to their
patients. The BPCA strengthened labeling requirements, but it did not man-
date proper labeling of drugs before marketing.' 8
In 1979, the FDA changed the labeling requirements to include a pediat-
ric use subsection. 119 Under this rule, if a manufacturer completed pediatric
trials and the drugs were approved for use in pediatric populations, then both
the indication and dose would be described under the appropriate labeling sec-
tions. If a drug had not been tested for use in children, then the label reflected
that by saying either "safety and effectiveness in pediatric patients below the
age of (_ have not been established" 120 or "safety and effectiveness in pedi-
atric patients have not been established."
2
'
The PREA does not contain a provision addressing proper use and label-
ing prior to marketing and use in children. During the congressional hearings
for the passage of the PREA, Representative Bart Stupack of Michigan stated:
So before a drug is marketed, it should be properly labeled
with all the necessary information to be used in pediatric pa-
tients. Doctors and patients and families have no idea on how
to administer drugs or what the effect will be on young people
without proper labeling. All I am saying is we should have
had an opportunity to amend this legislation to make sure be-
fore a patent is extended, before a drug is given for pediatric
patients, that the proper labeling is done and made available
to doctors, patients, and their families. It is marketed and
given to children before we know what the effects are on
117 149 CONG. REC. Hl1567, Hl1571 (2003) (statement of U.S. Rep. Bart Stupack of
Michigan).
..s Id. ("As we said earlier, the Best Pharmaceutical Act of 2002 did require a strengthen-
ing of labeling requirements, but it did not mandate proper labeling before marketing of these
drugs.").
''9 21 C.F.R. §§ 201-202 (2002); see Labson. supra note 39, at 39-41 (describing the
labeling requirements).
120 Specific Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drugs. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(9)(v) (2002); see Labson, supra note 39. at 40.
121 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(9)(vi); see Labson. supra note 39, at 40.
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young people. 122
One of the main reasons for the need for pediatric testing is that physi-
cians were "dosing down" prescriptions for children based on body weight. 123
But "dosing down" from a whole tablet to a halfa tablet, for example, may not
be the appropriate dosage - or even a safe medication - for a child. Indeed, the
reason for this is that children are still developing and may have different bio-
chemical reactions to any particular drug, whether it is a full dose or a partial
dose, and "dosing down" may be ineffective or potentially harmful. A pediat-
ric clinical trial should determine both the safety of the drug and the optimal
dose and these should be reflected on the label so a physician can prescribe a
drug correctly. To address this problem, a stricter time frame for safe and ef-
fective drugs should be implemented to comply with labeling requirements.
Moreover, if the results of a clinical trial are inconclusive or negative, the
labeling changes should reflect these results immediately. For example, if a
clinical trial is conducted for an antidepressant drug and the results show the
drug is safe but not effective, the label should reflect this result.12 4 The label
could say, "the results of a clinical trial show that this drug may be safe, but
not effective, for use in pediatric populations." In this way, the physician is
educated about the drug's potential benefits or lack thereof. This will give
pharmaceutical companies an incentive to conduct additional clinical trials to
determine effectiveness and thereby use in pediatric populations. Alterna-
tively, pharmaceutical companies may not want to conduct pediatric trials due
to their high cost and the possibility of negative results. But, if the FDA de-
termines that the drug is important for use in children, then the drug company
may be required to conduct the tests.
D. The FDA Should Implement Additional Post-Approval
Surveillance Mechanisms
The FDA can approve the use of a drug for children based on the results
of a pediatric clinical trial, but the clinical trials may not cover all age groups
or reveal long-term side effects. One of the biggest challenges in evaluating
pediatric populations is the biological immaturity of organs. Adolescents may
have very different biological reactions than toddlers. In addition, finding
122 149 CONG. REC. H11567, H11571 (2003) (statement of U.S. Rep. Bart Stupack of
Michigan).
123 Groopman, supra note 1.
124 Hearing on Antidepressant Pediatric Trials, supra note 87, at 17 (statement of U.S.
Rep. Bart Stupack of Michigan) ("Remember. each patent extension often means hundreds of
millions of dollars to the drug companies. This systematic flaw that rewards companies for
doing a study. the results of which are not made public, which may show the drug is not effec-
tive and actually may harm young people and the consumers' notice, the package labeling is not
immediately changed.")
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large sample sizes of children in a variety of age ranges makes conducting
clinical trials across an eighteen-plus year age span extremely challenging.
Thus, post-approval surveillance in pediatric populations will be a critical
source of safety and efficacy information.
The PREA is a step in the right direction for follow-up studies in pediat-
ric populations; however, it still suffers from some of the same flaws seen in
the complete FDA post-approval regulatory scheme. First, MedWatch is a
voluntary reporting system that allows physicians to report anecdotal informa-
tion about a particular drug. 125 MedWatch is a passive system for physician
reporting, and it is unclear whether it provides the appropriate breadth of in-
formation for the FDA to determine the potentially deleterious safety and effi-
cacy problems of approved drugs. 126 Second, the FDA suffers from an internal
structural dilemma. The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER")
is the part of the agency responsible for drug approval. Sitting below the
CDER is the Office of Drug Safety. Once the CDER approves a drug, some
hypothesize that tension exists, based on the hierarchy, and it may be difficult
for the Office of Drug Safety to invalidate the previous approval. 127 Finally,
the drug companies have little incentive to conduct and report clinical trials
that would show adverse drug reactions. In order to protect their economic
interests, drug companies may either not conduct additional clinical trials or
use subversive tactics to cover up negative information.128
The specific pediatric problems must be addressed by the FDA. Specifi-
cally, the FDA should establish a post-approval surveillance mechanism that
requires additional pediatric testing, follows anecdotal information, and uses
information gathered from similar agencies in other countries. As suggested
for the FDA in general, an independent body should exist to regulate and
monitor post-approval safety and efficacy of drugs. 129 Due to the recognized
niche of pediatric populations, an independent "Pediatric Post-Approval Sur-
veillance Safety and Efficacy Office" should be established.
This new office could address many of the problems described above. 
1 30
125 See U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and
Adverse Event Reporting Program, Form FDA 3500 (Oct. 2005) available at
http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/safety/3500.pdf (form used to voluntarily report adverse events
and product problems under the MedWatch program).
126 Phil B. Fontanarosa, Drummond Rennie & Catherine D. DeAngelis, Postnarketing
Surveillance Lack of Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2647, 2647, 2649
(2004) (describing MedWatch as a passive collection system); see also Groopman, supra note 1,
at 35-6.
127 Richard Horton, Vioxx, The Implosion of Merck, andAftershocks at the FDA, 364 THE
LANCET 1995, 1995 (2004) (describing the inherent flaws in the FDA regulatory scheme).
12' Fontanarosa, Rennie & DeAngelis, supra note 126, at 2649 (noting the industry's for-
profit motivations).
129 Id. (discussing the establishment of an independent agency for drug safety).
30 Id. at 2649-50 (proposing the establishment of an independent agency "to oversee
postmarketing surveillance for drugs and devices" and referencing other people's suggestions
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First, it could specifically enforce post-approval clinical trials needed for addi-
tional age groups or population sizes, and Congress could grant the new office
the ability to bring legal sanctions against manufacturers who fail to comply
with the mandatory post-approval testing. 131 Second, the office could evalu-
ate whether the voluntary MedWatch system is an effective means to monitor
post-approval adverse drug effects. The agency could also give the MedWatch
program a "face-lift" to allow it to effectively follow anecdotal information.
Finally, the new office could collaborate more closely with its sister organiza-
tions in other countries. Under this approach, the FDA may have reacted
faster to the needed ban on SSRIs prescribed to pediatric populations.
V1. CONCLUSION
The testing of drugs in pediatric populations runs along a regulation con-
tinuum. First, drugs that will be used in pediatric populations must be identi-
fied. Second, carefully planned and ethical clinical trials must be conducted.
Finally, post-approval surveillance systems should monitor additional informa-
tion learned about a particular drug.
The current regulatory and legislative schemes address only parts of the
continuum for safe and effective drug use in pediatric populations. New pol-
icy changes must be implemented to remedy the identified deficiencies.
The policy suggestions described above incorporate suggestions made by
others and offer important improvements. First, the dissemination of informa-
tion through public databases will provide the medical community with impor-
tant information when prescribing drugs to their patients. It will also hold the
manufacturers accountable for supplying the public with the results of their
trials. Second, the market exclusivity provision should only apply to drugs
that are shown to be safe and effective in pediatric populations. Third, stricter
time frames for labeling changes should occur with the results of pediatric tri-
als to provide physicians and patients with reliable information. Finally, to
address the post-approval surveillance problems, Congress could grant the
FDA the authority to establish an independent office to monitor safe and effec-
tive drug use in pediatric populations, evaluate the effectiveness of the volun-
tary MedWatch system, assess the current pediatric age group guidelines, and
work closely to share information with sister organizations in other countries.
A great many lessons are learned from evaluating the deficiencies in the
FDAMA, BPCA, and PREA. Due to the special nature of pediatric popula-
tions, they require heightened regulatory measures to provide them with safe
and effective drugs. Because the BPCA and the PREA will sunset in 2007,
many of the regulatory deficiencies can be addressed with new legislation and
regulatory schemes.
for a surveillance system).
131 Id. (discussing post-marketing studies and legal penalties).
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